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The short-term effects of fiscal consolidation have attracted an increasing attention from 
both the academia and policy makers in the recent years. Authors in the literature on non-
Keynesian effects usually put the emphasis on the need for the devaluation of the national 
currency, the accommodating reaction of the monetary authority and the favourable 
international economic conditions as the necessary accompanying tools of fiscal 
consolidation, in order to realise short-term expansionary effects. Some also add the necessity 
of large-scale adjustment; while others support the view that a high and increasing debt ratio 
or increasing government spending, by triggering an unavoidable adjustment, is the key to 
experiencing short-term expansionary effects. The composition of adjustment also became a 
crucial explanation for non-Keynesian effects. However, as the following critical assessment 
of the literature on expansionary fiscal consolidations will reveal, institutional conditions, 
such as the importance of the depth of financial intermediation and the influencing role of 
labour market structure, can prove to be crucial in the occurrence of the desired expansionary 
short-term effects. 
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1. Introduction1 
The launching of the single currency in Europe put fiscal policy in the highlight of 
academic research and policy analysis. While earlier fiscal policy was considered to be an 
exclusively national authority, the EMU-project changed this approach dramatically, 
emphasising the possibly controversial effects of national, autonomous fiscal policies on the 
stability of a monetary zone. In fact, after the delegation of monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy to a supranational level in 11 (and later 12) countries, only fiscal policy has remained 
as an ultimate tool in the hands of politicians in influencing aggregate demand. 
The steadily increasing interest regarding the efficiency of discretionary fiscal policy, 
however, could not provide clear-cut statements concerning its long-term and short-term 
effects – in fact, it propagated the doubts. On the one hand, the traditional Keynesian view 
claims a positive correlation between government spending and private demand. With the 
assumption of excess capacity and price/wage stickiness, the multiplier effect – through the 
channel of aggregate demand – helps the economy to cushion the severe social consequences 
of any economic downturn. On the other hand, the neoclassical view postulates just the 
opposite relationship between public spending and private consumption due to the wealth 
effect. And in fact, in its radical form (the Barro-Ricardian equivalence) it claims 
unequivocally that fiscal policy is irrelevant in influencing aggregate demand since any 
increase in government expenditure – financed by either debt or tax increase – will be fully 
offset by increased private savings. 
Nevertheless, it might be claimed that a consensus has formed, namely that the strict 
form of the Ricardian view (albeit theoretically appealing) does not correspond to reality. 
While the long-term ineffectiveness of discretionary fiscal measures may be true, Keynesian 
effects determine the output of fiscal policy in the short term. However, this apparent 
consensus was undermined by the experience of some countries in the last two decades, 
giving rise to another stream of arguments, the concept of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy. In the eighties, a large number of industrialised countries embarked on wide-scale 
reform programmes – targeting a reduction in debt to GDP ratio and reducing the level of 
deficit financing. It came as a surprise that fiscal adjustment was not accompanied with the 
much-echoed side effect of economic slowdown, but instead (some) countries experienced a 
relatively quick recovery in economic activity, an immediate acceleration in economic 
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growth. In their seminal paper, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were the very first to point out 
such unexpected outcomes, sometimes referring to the phenomenon as the perverse effects of 
fiscal policy. Later on, several papers have been published arguing that major fiscal 
consolidations proved to be expansionary in relatively large numbers in the last two decades. 
Giudice et al (2003) and Afonso (2000) for instance claimed that non-Keynesian effects are 
not that peculiar and rare indeed in the EU for instance. 
If indeed no trade off exists between the long term benefits and the short term costs of 
fiscal adjustment, a fiscal consolidation can be made effectively costless in principle for not 
just the private agents but also for the politicians. With positive growth effects, it would be 
easy to sell the idea of fiscal adjustment to voters without the government being threatened by 
citizens to be voted out from power at next election. However, certain questions arise. 
1. If non-Keynesian effects are so attractive, why are governments still reluctant 
to embark on the cutting of expenditures, to go ahead with the reform of their 
general budget? 
2. Or to put it more constructively: if the expansionary effects of fiscal 
contraction exist, why do only a few countries and only in certain times 
experience these effects, while others not at all? 
Authors in the literature on non-Keynesian effects usually (and mostly unanimously) 
put the emphasis on the need for the devaluation of the national currency, the accommodating 
reaction of the monetary authority by reducing interest rates and the favourable international 
economic conditions as the necessary accompanying tools of fiscal consolidations in order to 
realise the perverse effects of fiscal consolidation (Perotti 1996, Hagen et al., 2001). Some 
also add the necessity of large-scale adjustment, that is, size must matter (Giavazzi and 
Pagano, 1996); while others support the view that a high and increasing debt ratio (Blanchard, 
1990, Sutherland 1997 and Perotti 1999) or increasing government spending (Bertola and 
Drazen 1993), by triggering an unavoidable adjustment, is the key to experiencing the short-
term expansionary effects of fiscal stabilisation. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina et 
al. (2002), on the other hand, place the emphasis on supply-side factors. In their opinion, it is 
the composition of adjustment what matters in providing non-Keynesian effects. 
However, as the following critical assessment of the literature on non-Keynesian effects 
will reveal, institutional conditions, such as the importance of the depth of financial 
intermediation (close-to-perfect credit markets) and the influencing role of labour market 
structure, can prove to be crucial in the occurrence of the desired expansionary short-term 
effects in times of fiscal adjustment. Following the short introduction, section two provides a 
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critical evaluation of the demand-side approaches of non-Keynesian effects and by 
deconstructing the theory it points out the importance of the lack of liquidity constraint and 
the depth of financial intermediation. Section three turns to an alternative explanation of 
expansionary effects, focusing on the supply-side of adjustment; the importance of the 
composition of adjustment and the structure of the labour market will also be elaborated on. 
Section four concludes, by summarising the lessons to be learnt. 
2. The expectational view of fiscal policy2 
The term “non-Keynesian effects” refers by definition to a situation where the fiscal 
multiplier turns out to be negative. This surprising outcome, i.e. the acceleration of economic 
growth in times of fiscal contraction, is triggered by the changing behaviour of rational, 
forward-looking private agents who expect their tax liabilities to decline in the future. 
Certainly the induced change in behaviour requires explanation. 
2.1. Conceptualising expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation 
Feldstein (1982) pointed out that the credibility of fiscal adjustment can be crucial in 
changing privates’ behaviour by signalling the government’s willingness to give up the 
previously exerted lax policy and to turn to sound macro finances. Credible fiscal adjustment 
therefore may have a positive effect on aggregate demand as opposed to the conventional 
view. Nevertheless, credibility effect is strongly related to change on risk premia and indeed 
the ultimate triggering factor for increased consumption is lowered interest rates. In a country 
with a high level of indebtedness, the risk premia reflect a substantial currency and country 
risk, causing interest rates to stabilise at relatively high levels. Any increase in the interest 
rates would depreciate financial assets in nominal terms and consumers possessing these 
financial assets will suffer a loss and consume less in the future. Accordingly, a credible fiscal 
tightening will reduce interest rates in the economy and will induce privates to spend more on 
consumption due to the positive wealth effect. It is hardly surprising that large adjustments are 
more likely to end up with a drop in risk premia as opposed to small-sized consolidations, 
since political commitment seems to be more explicit in the former case. 
Blanchard (1990), however, tried to explain the puzzle provided by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) differently and turned to the initial conditions such as the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
order to conceptualise non-Keynesian effects properly. According to Blanchard and the 
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authors working on the expectational view of fiscal policy, it is the initial conditions which 
can induce individuals to change their expectations on future tax liabilities. In the case of a 
too high level of debt or excessive and accelerating public spending (as it was hypothesised 
by Bertola and Drazen in 1993), the state of public finances will deteriorate to such a degree 
that sooner or later a regime change will take place. In such a situation every action which 
saves the economy from a final catastrophe may have indeed a positive growth effect. 
In order to illustrate how non-Keynesian effects can occur in theory, Blanchard’s (1990) 
simple model will be presented here. Blanchard focused exclusively on the taxation side and 
raised the question whether a tax increase, given government spending, might generate 
expansion in private consumption. He assumed that both taxation and government debt have a 
critical value which automatically enforces the government to take actions. In a deterministic 
model, at any point in time, given the current tax and debt level smaller than the critical 
values and its dynamics, anyone can calculate the exact date of debt reaching the critical level. 
Marginal costs of taxation increase with the tax rate and the longer the government waits with 
the stabilisation, the higher the tax increase has to be. 
Blanchard then argued that there are two channels by which government consolidation 
through taxes can affect expectations. First, the traditional one: an intertemporal redistribution 
of taxes from tomorrow to today which in turn reduces current generations’ consumption. 
This effect is the stronger as long as consumers behave in a non-Ricardian manner. However, 
there is a second channel, too: “by taking measure today, the government eliminates the need 
for larger, maybe much more disruptive adjustments in the future and this may in turn 
increase consumption.” (p. 111.) That is, if consolidation takes place before the critical value 
of the debt level has been reached, the economy can be saved from a catastrophe which is 
good news to everyone (moreover, uncertainty decreases and precautionary savings can be 
lowered, too). The tax increase today, aiming at consolidating the fiscal stance, transforms 
expectations towards a less distortionary taxation tomorrow. In turn, individuals will expect 
their permanent income to increase and thereby they will consume more and save less in the 
present.3 
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  Nevertheless, the expectation view is rather heterogeneous. Some conceptualise the rational, forward-looking 
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pure waste (Bertola and Drazen 1993). 
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As it has been illustrated in Blanchard’s simple deterministic model as well, a unique 
feature of the expectational view is the introduction of the so-called “non-linear demand 
effect” of fiscal policy. According to this concept, nature has two faces: good (or normal) 
times and bad (or unusual) times. The reason for distinguishing between the two regimes is 
straightforward: expectations on the future tax burden must be different under different 
scenarios. Accordingly, non-linearity in demand means that while consumers follow a certain 
pattern in their behaviour in most of the time (Keynesian for instance), there may arise certain 
conditions due to which consumers adopt a different behaviour (Ricardian in our example). 
Such a switch can occur if the fiscal position of a country deteriorates into an unsustainable 
one. The unsustainable stance of fiscal policy in turn will trigger a change in individuals’ 
perceptions on their permanent income. While in good times consumers behave as if they 
were Keynesians, a high level and/ or accelerating debt or high and increasing public 
spending (the bad times) will induce individuals to turn their behaviour into a Ricardian one. 
Practically, what this means is that while in good times an increase in government spending 
would induce Keynesian consumers to increase consumption (positive multiplier), in bad 
times a further increase in government consumption will reduce (the suddenly Ricardian) 
consumers’ appetite (negative multiplier). It is in fact this switch or non-linearity in reactions 
which induces non-Keynesian effects to emerge, triggered by the observed change in the state 
of the economy. 
For sure, the two basic approaches of the expectational view of fiscal policy outlined 
above, namely credibility effect (emphasising size) and the non-linearity of demand (focusing 
on initial conditions) cannot be claimed to be mutually exclusive. An unsustainable stance of 
fiscal policy (especially in its most extreme form of an approaching fiscal crisis) will force the 
government to embark on fiscal tightening sooner or later. A crucial question concerning the 
emergence of non-Keynesian effects is whether the government’s plan to reduce fiscal 
imbalances will come across as credible. Privates’ expectations will change only if the 
uncertainty in relation to the fiscal policy of the government can be eliminated and individuals 
do believe that the actions taken by the government will be ultimately successful and lasting.4 
Credible government action therefore makes it possible for individuals to expect a less 
distortionary taxation in the future, and in turn they will modify their expectations on 
permanent income in a positive direction and will start increasing consumption in the 
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present.5 It is exactly this increase in private consumption which can compensate for the 
reduced government consumption in case of a fiscal adjustment. If the increase in private 
spending can indeed offset the direct negative effects of decreased government spending on 
aggregate demand, then fiscal contraction can be expansionary. On the contrary, if the 
consolidation plan of the government is not serious enough and suffers from a lack of 
credibility, the action taken by the cabinet will not have an effect on privates’ intertemporal 
budget constraint and leaves therefore the permanent income of individuals unchanged. In this 
latter case, textbook Keynesian effects will occur and adjustment itself may prove to be 
unsuccessful in the sense that deficit reduction can prove to be temporary only, and will not 
have the much-needed, long-lasting effects. Debt accumulation cannot be stopped and the 
government will soon have to embark on a new consolidation effort in order to turn back the 
unsustainable trends of public finances. 
While the demand-side theoretisation of non-Keynesian effects seem to be rather 
appealing, their empirical relevance is still debated.6 Perotti (1999), in his empirical test, came 
up with the idea that the switch in expectations occurs only in times of high and increasing 
debt ratios, which was also confirmed by Bhattacharya (1999). What is more, on a smaller 
sample (including Italy and Canada 40 years of data on), Pozzi (2001) found support for this 
view, too. Second, in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1996), the switch of expectation was 
conditioned on the initiation of large adjustment which proved to be persistent (i.e. the debt to 
GDP ratio was lowered significantly). Giavazzi and Pagano together with Jappelli (1998) 
repeated the test for OECD countries and confirmed their previous results: fiscal impulses 
must be large and protracted to give rise to expansionary effects in times of fiscal 
consolidation. However, they also added that debt was not a good predictor at all of non-
Keynesian effects. Their finding was supported later on by McDermott and Wescott (1996) 
using an OECD panel, and Afonso (2000), who compiled the test by data from the EU. 
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  Technically, the empirical estimation of non-Keynesian effects means that by testing a consumption or a 
saving reaction function, scholars try to grasp the switch in the sign of the response of private consumers due to a 
changed action (profile) of fiscal policy. The task is therefore to construct a consumption function which allows 
fiscal variables to explain the changes in private consumption. The function comprises both differences and 
lagged values of variables, often called the distributed lag model, a convenient and simple form of econometric 
modelling. An appealing feature of the specification is that it makes the researcher able to nest both the 
conventional Keynesian view of consumption, and its neoclassical approach. The estimation technique 
comprises the usual OLS estimation and the two-stage least squares estimation method (instruments are 
generally the lagged values of the variables). Höppner (2000:5) expresses the advantage of such a model 
succinctly: “This specification … has proved [to be] sufficiently flexible to capture the time-series aspects of the 
data as well as the main determinants from the theory”.  
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Van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) repeated Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1996) exercise by 
applying different definitions for the term “exceptional”. Surprisingly, the authors disproved 
the import of regime changes, denunciating the relevance of the expectation view in 
explaining non-Keynesian effects. Miller and Russek (2003) found only a limited evidence 
for the relevance of trigger points. Schclarek (2004) rejected harshly the expectational view 
by claiming that government spending shocks have Keynesian effects exclusively – no regime 
change can be expected to occur therefore. He also found that tax shocks have no effect 
whatsoever on private consumption. 
2.2 Intertemporal decisions – the modern theory of consumption 
While the expectational view of fiscal policy may still lack irrefutable empirical 
support, it has proved to be strong in theory and attracted an increased interest in the 
academia. However, the expectational view, assuming a shift in consumers’ behaviour, builds 
its theoretical setup on several conditions which may or may not be met in reality. Next 
therefore, a deconstruction of the expectation view will follow, by exploring that one of the 
assumptions, the lack of liquidity constraint, can strongly invalidate the practical usage of the 
theory. If so, it may lose its significance in providing policy recommendations to 
accommodate the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects. But on the other hand, it also reveals 
how important financial deepening is in the weakening of the credit constraint and in 
increasing the chance for people to act as predicted by the models of expectation view. 
As we argued above, demand side explanations of non-Keynesian effects base their 
conceptualisation of the expansionary efects on the combination of the rational expectations 
theory and the permanent income hypothesis. Their main claim is that rational, forward-
looking consumers are able to react to policy changes (spending cut for instance) via the 
modification of their expectations of wealth and permanent income. It is, in fact, the change in 
permanent income that triggers a boost in economic activity when government embarks on 
fiscal adjustment. 
If the objective of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the working of perverse 
fiscal effects and more importantly to gather together those conditions that are inevitable to 
experience non-Keynesian effects, it seems to be a good starting point to discuss in some 
length the development of the consumption theory, focusing mostly on the life-cycle and 
permanent income hypothesis and the rational expectations breakthrough in modelling 
consumption behaviour. By introducing Robert Hall’s famous stochastic permanent income 
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model, it becomes possible to establish a ground for linking together modern consumption 
theory and non-Keynesian effects. Moreover, the criticism of the model possibly helps us (1) 
to uncover some of the shortcomings of the non-Keynesian theory; and (2) to understand why 
it is rather difficult to find empirical support of the occurrence of non-linear effects of fiscal 
policy in a great majority of countries. 
The intertemporal choice model of Irving Fischer can be interpreted as a criticism 
towards the Keynesian consumption function which determines current consumption as a 
simple function of current disposable income (or some other lags of it). Fischer instead 
explained current consumption by current and future income, that is, he adopted a forward-
looking calculus of consumption behaviour. By introducing the concept of the intertemporal 
budget constraint of individuals, he was able to establish a link between consumption and the 
expected total (lifetime) resources, or in other words, wealth. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that by arguing that consumption decision was based on lifetime earnings, Fischer established 
modern consumption theory. 
It was Fischer’s new approach to consumption behaviour that induced Modigliani and 
later on Friedman to develop their own concepts to address some of the puzzles which 
remained unexplained by Keynesian consumption functions, such as the difference between 
long-term and short-term consumption functions. Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis helped 
enormously to understand why people are inclined to smooth their consumption over time, a 
phenomenon that contradicts traditional arguments. Modigliani’s main interest was to show 
how people are able to guarantee a relatively stable (or constant) standard of living even in the 
presence of fluctuations in income throughout their lives by operating with saving and 
dissaving.7 
On the other hand, while Friedman found similar results (concerning especially the 
inclination to consumption smoothing and the relative stability of consumption in contrast 
with income), he adopted a rather different approach by assuming that income is a production 
of an uncertain, random process, where transitory changes may occur. (Modigliani instead 
stated that income follows some regularity, that is, wealth increases definitely throughout the 
working years, while it decreases after that.) Friedman (1957) disaggregated income into two 
main elements: permanent and transitory. A change in permanent income has a (close to) one-
to-one effect on private consumption, while a change in the transitory part may have only a 
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rather small impact, since it should be spread over the whole lifespan (that is, marginal 
propensity to consumption must be different in the two cases, being close to zero in the latter 
one). The permanent income hypothesis states accordingly that there exists a steady rate of 
consumption throughout the lifetime of an individual – taking into account his current wealth 
status and the future flow of income. Nevertheless, Friedman’s radical change came with the 
statement that private consumption is not simply a deterministic function of future 
(permanent) income but it is the expectations of agents about their future wealth status that 
determines consumption. Expectations therefore became a strong building block in the 
understanding of consumption behaviour. 
The further development and formalisation of Modigliani’s and especially Friedman’s 
theory came with the appearance of new classical macroeconomics which combined the life-
cycle/permanent income hypothesis with rational expectations. Hall (1978) showed that if 
forward-looking consumers held rational expectations and the permanent income hypothesis 
was valid, private consumption would follow a random walk, which means that the change in 
consumption cannot be predicted by testing for lags in income or any other variables. The best 
guess for any future value of consumption is its current value. In line with the rational 
expectations theory, only unexpected or surprise changes can have an effect on consumption, 
any change which has been predicted cannot have an influence on consumption. Decision on 
consumption is then based on all the available information concerning permanent income. 
Accordingly, in the stochastic permanent income hypothesis model, any change in 
consumption is a reflection of a surprise change in the expected lifetime income (due to 
technological change or policy change for instance). It comes as no surprise that Hall’s 
random walk model of consumption behaviour has a logical policy implication: only those 
policies can have an effect on private consumption, which have not been predicted, that is, 
government can influence aggregate demand successfully only if the policy comes as a 
(credible) surprise and it is able to alter the expectations of individuals’ wealth (permanent 
income). This implication proved to be highly important in the expectation view of non-
Keynesian effects. 
2.3 Non-Keynesian effects and the criticism of Hall’s stochastic model – the 
importance of liquidity constraints 
The theoretical findings and the empirical implications of the stochastic model of the 
permanent income hypothesis were radical and extreme: no lagged values of consumption and 
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income can be used in future forecasts and more importantly only changes in expectations on 
future income can explain current consumption. However, reality contradicts the pure theory 
of consumption behaviour based on the random walk assumption. According to empirical 
research, in certain cases consumers do base their consumption-decisions on the lagged values 
of disposable income or simply disregard the news related to the future prospects of 
income/wealth which should in principle affect permanent income and consumption. If this is 
the case, however, the chance for realising non-Keynesian effects may be undermined 
dramatically. The higher is the share of the population who determine consumption by 
considering current income only, the less ideal is the situation for the occurrence of 
expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation. 
Campbell and Mankiw (1990) constructed a model which combines Hall’s random walk 
consumption theory and the traditional consumption function by assuming a world populated 
with heterogeneous households. In the stochastic PIH model, the change in consumption 
equals the innovation term (εt+1), while in the traditional model the change in consumption 
can be traced back to proportional changes in the disposable income as a rule-of-thumb. 
Assuming that a certain part of the population (λ) follows the traditional consumption 
function (the Keynesian consumers) and the remaining part (1-λ) behaves as it has been 
predicted by Hall’s model (labelled sometimes the Ricardian consumers), the aggregate 
change in consumption equals: 
 ∆C  = λ ∆CTRAD + (1-λ) ∆CPIH 
  = λ MPC ∆Yd + (1-λ) εt+1 
If Hall’s random walk model is correct, ∆C should equal the innovation term with the 
expected value of zero, that is, λ has to be zero, too (H0 : λ = 0 and H1 : λ > 0). However, the 
authors found a statistically significant value for the part of the Keynesian population (almost 
half of the consumption behaviour was explained by current income).8 
The obvious question arises: why do people behave then as if they were Keynesians in 
both normal and bad times? One explanation is liquidity or borrowing constraint. In the PIH 
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the permanent income hypothesis, such an expected change in the future cannot have any affect when they come 
into effect (since these are taken into account at the moment the agreement is signed); Shea, however, found just 
the opposite: 1 per cent raise in the wage was followed by 0.89 per cent increase in consumption.  
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models, households can borrow without limits in order to achieve consumption-smoothing 
over time. However, in real world economy, this is hardly the truth. What we find is a 
dramatic variance in the degree of accessibility to credit markets not just across countries but 
also over time. As a matter of fact, while people are indeed alike in the sense that they behave 
rationally, they do face different constraints. 
In the presence of liquidity constraint, individuals will base their consumption decisions 
on current income alone, irrespective of the possibility of the increase in future permanent 
income. Accordingly, Mankiw (2000:460) states that with the liquidity constraint “Keynes’s 
original consumption function starts to look more attractive”. However, what might be 
appealing from a purely academic viewpoint such as Mankiw’s, it can be devastating for 
those who advocate the emergence of non-Keynesian effects on the basis of lacking liquidity 
constraint. Liquidity constraint certainly means that individuals are not able to or are not 
allowed to borrow as much as they want – even if they do expect a flow of high income in the 
future. 
Necessarily, the following (interrelated) question(s) arise(s): why does liquidity 
constraint exist, how can it be measured and can it be overcome? Regarding the first question, 
according to many, one of the main reasons for the prevalence of liquidity constraint is the 
underdevelopment of financial markets and/or the imperfect working of credit markets – see 
especially the seminal work of Jappelli and Pagano (1989). Putting together all of these pieces 
of the puzzle, it is reasonable to claim that the prevailing huge variance in the degree of 
financial depth, the accessibility to credit markets, can be a determining factor for the 
emergence of non-Keynesian effects. The different degrees of the development of financial 
intermediation systems may partly explain why specific countries experience the 
expansionary effects while others only to a lesser extent or not at all. 
2.4 Measuring liquidity constraint in developed economies 
Before turning to the assessment of some empirical findings in the literature, it is worth 
raising once again the question why liquidity constraints, or more precisely the number of 
consumers suffering from credit denial, could be important from a policy point of view. 
Liquidity constraints, indeed, can have serious implications for policy decisions, especially 
regarding the issue of targeting. The ultimate effect of any fiscal decision is largely sensitive 
to what portion of the population suffers from credit constraint. In the presence of liquidity 
constrained individuals, a tax cut for instance would not be followed by more consumer 
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saving in order to finance the future burden of tax increase, as it is predicted by the 
neoclassical Barro-Ricardian equivalence. Instead, the cut would increase aggregate demand 
(and current consumption) – an implication that contradicts with PIH. Accordingly, the 
existence of credit constraints undermines policy-neutrality: even temporary changes in fiscal 
spending/revenues can have a positive multiplier effect. These cuts would work more 
effectively if government policies were able to target those individuals who are relatively 
young, earn relatively less and do not have an established credit history, do not possess 
houses or other assets, that is, the low-savers. Large families are usually also among the 
targeted groups since they are expected to be more credit-constrained. Importantly, in the 
presence of the non-neutrality of fiscal policy, the government would confidentially embark 
on a Keynesian anti-cyclical macroeconomic stabilisation with the hope of experiencing a 
positive multiplier. Consequently, there is no hope for achieving non-Keynesian effects. 
Assessing the share of population who suffer from liquidity constraint is not an easy 
task, however. The general technique for measuring liquidity constraint is to use some 
suitable proxies, thereby indirectly grasping the share of constrained households. In empirical 
works, the measures of the depth of financial intermediation play the role of proxy the most 
often. The hypothesis is straightforward: the deeper is financial intermediation (the higher is 
the credit to household measured in GDP), the less is the chance for experiencing liquidity 
constraint. Based on our previous analysis of PIH models and the expectation view of fiscal 
policy, this assumed relation on financial intermediation and credit constraint can be further 
considered by claiming that the deepening of financial intermediation can support the more 
effective working of PIH models, which is a basic building block of the expectation view. 
Jappelli (1990) for instance used a data set of individuals who were applying for credit 
but failed (the so-called called “rejected customers”), to assess the share of people suffering 
from credit constraint. His data set also documented the share of those consumers who were 
simply afraid of applying for credit and therefore simply abstained (the “discouraged 
borrowers”). The author found that according to a 1983 survey of American households, 
approximately 19 per cent of the population was rejected or discouraged, that is, they 
definitely suffered from a liquidity constraint. The explanations for being rejected or 
discouraged from borrowing formed a wide spectrum; reasons included the following: lack of 
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established credit history (applicants were too young for instance), insufficient credit record 
or bankruptcy, low level of income or assets, etc.9 
In another paper, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) found dramatic differences in the degree 
of access to credit markets in a cross-country analysis of OECD countries. The authors 
assessed the degree of liquidity constraint by measuring (i) the volume of consumer credit 
available to households (as a ratio to the net national product); and (ii) the own down-
payment in case of purchasing a house. Albeit it is hard to come up with unquestionable 
statements, intuitively, in case of a low level of consumer credit or high value for down 
payment, the chance for a dampening of consumption will increase. In Jappelli and Pagano’s 
(1994) regression analysis, a 1 per cent increase in consumer credit reduced savings by 0.3 
per cent, while a 1 per cent decrease in down payment forced savings to be reduced by 0.2 per 
cent (results are statistically significant). To extend their findings to the topic of non-
Keynesian effects, it can be argued that a higher accessibility to consumer credit or a lower 
down-payment in case of purchasing a house – that is a deeper financial intermediation – may 
cause people to react more intensively to changes in permanent income and thereby increase 
the probability of non-Keynesian effects to arise. 
Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind that there is a clear difference between (i) 
what the theory and the deductive analysis suggests concerning non-Keynesian effects; and 
(ii) what empirical studies conducted on non-Keynesian effects and liquidity constraint imply. 
(i) By the deconstruction of the expectation view of fiscal policy on the one hand and 
consumption theory on the other hand, it has become possible to reach a number of significant 
conclusions. The most important theoretical inference has been the following: liquidity 
constraint in fact compels individuals to behave as it is predicted by the Keynesian 
consumption function, that is the presence of liquidity constraints may lower the chance for a 
shift in agents’ behaviour from the Keynesian to the Ricardian. More to the point: the 
prevalence of liquidity constraint does not support the appearance of non-Keynesian effects. 
Importantly, this is an inference that has been drawn deductively by having deconstructed 
modern consumption theory and the expectation view of fiscal policy. 
                                                 
9
 Using a different method – similar to that of Campbell and Mankiw (1990) –, Jappelli and Pagano (1989) also 
found the same ratio for the US. The authors used a sample of OECD countries in their estimation and placed the 
countries into three categories accordingly. Sweden and the US belonged to the first group, with the lowest 
excess sensitivity to current income. The UK and Japan were found to have a 30-40 per cent ratio of constrained 
individuals. This figure was above 50 per cent in Italy, Greece and Spain. 
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Taking these considerations into account, what we can claim here is that since the 
deepening of financial intermediation might be able to lift liquidity constraint, it also may 
increase indirectly the likelihood of experiencing non-Keynesian effects in times of fiscal 
consolidation. Policy conclusions such as the need for deepening financial intermediation, 
especially the increase of accessibility of households to credit markets, may prove to be valid 
on a normative ground. 
(ii) Turning to the empirical side of the problem, it would be a failure, however, to 
claim that countries with a relatively complex and deep financial intermediation will always 
conduct a successful fiscal consolidation where success means accelerated economic growth 
in the short term. It would also be misleading to argue that an underdeveloped financial 
system necessarily prevents a country from experiencing accelerated growth following a fiscal 
adjustment. Ireland in the eighties with its relatively underdeveloped financial intermediation 
system is a good example for underpinning this. While with its relatively underdeveloped 
financial system in the late eighties Ireland was able to experience non-Keynesian effects, no 
such experiment was made either in the nineties or in the new millennium – times when the 
depth of financial intermediation increased dramatically in the country. However, elaborating 
on the eighties, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) made an interesting observation regarding the 
Irish case. According to the authors, among several other factors, liquidity constraint might 
have contributed significantly to the failure of the first Irish stabilisation attempt in 1982-83: 
the cuts in public spending and especially the raise in taxes triggered an immediate decrease 
of disposable household income (causing a drastic fall in private consumption as well). The 
second Irish consolidation attempt between 1987 and 1989 was undertaken after the initiation 
of a wide-scale liberalisation programme in credit markets. Liberalisation increased 
substantially households’ ability to borrow in the anticipation of higher future wealth. The 
Irish example may suggest therefore that it is not the level of financial depth what matters but 
its dynamism. 
3. The composition of adjustment and the structure of the labour market 
Although the theoretical literature on the non-Keynesian effects focused almost 
exclusively on the consumption channel in the nineties, there were a few exceptions such as 
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), who have pointed out that even without a too detailed 
and deep scrutiny, it is tempting to realise that increase in investment contributed largely (in 
fact, disproportionately so) to the growth of GDP in times of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) came up with supportive statistical evidence by 
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having documented several cases of successful adjustment, providing a strongly different 
rationalisation for the quick recovery in economic performance than that of the expectation 
view of fiscal policy. 
3.1. A linear approach to the rationalisation of expansionary fiscal consolidations 
This new approach proved to be highly sceptical of the expectation view of fiscal 
consolidation (discussed in the previous section). It has been argued that although in principle 
wealth effects and consumption might be a channel in the realisation of non-Keynesian 
effects, it is hard to support the demand-side view by statistical evidence. In fact, authors 
belonging to this camp repeatedly found that the growth rate of consumption is not 
significantly different in the case of expansionary or contractionary consolidations – while 
investment differs enormously. Authors critical to the relevance of the consumption channel 
add also that the economic expansion realised after (or even during) fiscal consolidation via 
the consumption channel will necessarily prove to be short-lived. Contrary to such a short-
lived effect, investment may be accumulated in the longer term as well, providing a solid 
ground for expansionary fiscal consolidations. 
Supply-side approaches are basically empirics-oriented and – as opposed to demand-
side explanations – do not attempt to provide theoretical rationalisations. Researchers 
following this view are convinced that “there may be nothing special in the behaviour of 
investment at the time of expansionary fiscal adjustments… The estimated effects of spending 
and taxes on investment imply that the different composition of the stabilisation package can 
account for the observed difference in investment growth rates” (Alesina et al. 2002:576). 
That is, the emergence of expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation simply follows the 
textbook rule of economics: lower costs, induced by spending cuts in wages and other welfare 
items, makes investment more profitable and desirable. The authors continue by claiming that 
“[w]e do not find significant ‘non-linearities’ or structural breaks in the reaction of investment 
around large fiscal consolidations. This result suggests that we may not need ‘special theories’ 
to explain episodes of large fiscal adjustments” (ibid. 576). 
Modelling the mechanism of the emergence of expansionary effects of fiscal contraction 
within the supply side framework means that the ultimate unit of decision-making will be the 
rational, forward-looking firm (as opposed to the consumer in the demand-side approaches) 
which tries to maximise the expected present value of future cash flow (just like the 
permanent income of consumers in demand-side theory) and decides on the current level of 
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investment accordingly. Profit and investment depends on the marginal product of capital that 
is in turn determined by the ratio of capital and labour. Any increase in real wage will 
increase the capital-labour ratio and decrease therefore the marginal product of capital, 
lowering profit and investment. 
Figure 3: The supply-side rationalisation of non-Keynesian effects. 
 
Source: own construction. 
The change in real wages, triggered by fiscal adjustment depends, however, on two 
conditions: (1) the composition of adjustment and (2) the structure of labour market. 
The paper of Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) on OECD countries 
demonstrates that different types of fiscal measures affect private investment significantly 
differently. The composition of adjustment highly determines what outcome can be expected 
from a macroeconomic viewpoint. Fiscal contraction may have the effect of growh 
acceleration if it triggers government wages, and to a lesser extent, but still significantly, the 
transfers to the population. The competitiveness and the profit prospects of the private sector 
improve when the government cuts back on these politically sensitive items. Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998), following Alesina and Perotti (1995), repeatedly emphasised the need for 
cuts in public employment, in transfer programmes and in compensation of government 
employees.10 According to their findings, labour market becomes more efficient if these three 
items are tackled, making the costs of labour relatively lower – which in turn may boost 
economic activity. 
However, fiscal adjustment can trigger a change in real wages only if the labour market 
and the wage bargaining structure facilitate such a change. In real world economy, labour 
                                                 
10
  Alesina and Ardagna (1998:516) claim in their conclusion that “the composition of the adjustment appears as 
the strongest predictor of the growth effect: all of the non-expansionary adjustments were tax based and all of the 
expansionary ones were expenditure based.” 
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markets are often rigid, in the sense that the change in taxes cannot significantly alter 
individual labour supply. Labour markets in some instances are very far from being 
competitive and the role of trade unions can be especially strong in wage negotiations. In a 
unionised economy, the burden of tax increase may fall on the employer, causing a serious 
deterioration in competitiveness and profitability. The burden of labour taxes such as personal 
income tax or social security contributions cannot be placed entirely on employees because 
with the help of trade unions and the institutionalised system of wage bargaining workers are 
able to shift the costs of tax increase to the firms. In a unionised economy, employees will 
demand higher pre-tax wages in response to a rise in labour taxes. In fact, in a unionised 
system of labour, the aggregate effect of tax increase on labour supply can be high enough to 
depart significantly from the neoclassical world of competitive economy. 
Whether employees are able to transmit the burden of tax increase to the employer (and 
to what extent are workers able to shift the burden to the firms) is a question of the structure 
of the labour market. Trade unions with a different degree of centralisation (and coverage) 
internalise the consequences of tax increase differently. In a simplistic approach, if trade 
unions are large and encompassing, the demand for a wage increase will remain moderate. 
However, if unions are strong enough to pressurise the government to raise wages but are 
weak in the sense that they are unable to cover a high portion of employees, the ability for 
internalising the loss of competitiveness is weak, too. Trade unions therefore will not 
moderate their demand for wage increase, thereby damaging the competitiveness of the 
country painfully. This conviction was first conceptualised by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
and it was taken as granted by many later on. 
However, Europe in the late eighties and nineties experienced a continuous 
deterioration in the degree of centralisation of the labour markets, thereby becoming more and 
more deregulated. Interestingly, this happened quite often within a more centralised structure 
of collective bargaining. According to the OECD (2004:130), when comparing the seventies 
and the nineties, no OECD country attempted to initiate a greater degree of centralisation in 
collective contracts negotiations, while some countries did move towards greater 
decentralisation. Nevertheless, this move was supplemented sometimes by a strengthened 
coordination that could take place in the forms of social pacts, pattern bargaining, peak-level 
coordination or stronger government involvement in tripartite negotiations. 
Soskice (1990) and Hancké and Soskice (2003) argued that albeit centralisation might 
not have been improved in the last few decades, coordination has strengthened. The structural 
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changes in the world economy have strongly motivated EU countries to make further 
adjustments in the labour market and the wage bargaining system. The ultimate aim was to 
create a system of collective bargaining which could ensure the maintenance of 
competitiveness. In most cases, the means to this end was found in the formally or informally 
centralised social pacts. In general, social pacts reflected the recognition that both employers 
and employees could mutually benefit from an agreement which pushed labour markets in the 
direction of more flexibility but kept wage negotiations in a highly coordinated framework, 
which enabled the partners to strike an agreement on wage accords. Practically, the revival of 
social pacts meant that decisions on wages were transferred into the hands of a few centrally 
appointed experts – although not necessarily in a formal and binding way. 
As opposed to the early years of corporatism, the resurgence of social partnership was 
not accompanied by the revival of trade unions. Wage moderation did not come along with 
providing extra benefit for employees (in the form of welfare programmes for instance) - as it 
was the practice in the sixties and seventies. Social pacts simply did not mean the 
strengthening of trade unionism in Europe. Accordingly, the new social partnership, however, 
did not aim at eliminating lower level negotiations at the expense of strengthened top-level 
agreements. Social pacts instead provided a solid framework with specific rules and 
procedures with the clear aim of attaining economy-wide goals – a process often referred to as 
concertation in the industrial relations literature. Such an organised decentralisation (a term 
invented by Traxler, 1995) appeared in countries like Ireland and Italy, and was revived in the 
Netherlands, Finland, Greece and Portugal. Interestingly enough, Giudice et al. (2003) 
identified almost exactly the same countries where expansionary fiscal consolidation had been 
observed at some time. 
4. What have we learnt – if anything? 
In this paper an attempt has been made to critically assess the explanations of the 
astonishing performance of some adjustment cases in EU countries in the eighties and 
nineties, as it has been first documented by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). The explanations 
maintain that the acceleration of economic growth in the year of fiscal contraction is basically 
triggered by the changing behaviour of rational, forward-looking private agents, via changing 
their consumption or investment behaviour. 
Accordingly, the paper tried to identify those circumstances and conditions which can 
prove to be indispensable in altering individuals’ (consumers’ and entrepreneurs’) 
expectations so as to experience non-Keynesian effects and also elaborated on the main 
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mechanisms through which these expansionary effects can be expected to emerge in the short 
term. By reviewing the most important concepts, the three possible factors that can trigger a 
change in individuals’ decisions have been identified as follows: (1) the size of adjustment; 
(2) the level and acceleration of the debt ratio and/or government spending; and (3) the 
composition of adjustment. 
However, our critical assessment also showed that both demand-side and supply-side 
conceptualisations of non-Keynesian effects are highly sensitive to institutional factors, such 
as the depth of financial intermediation and the structure of the labour market. As a corollary, 
policy-makers should be cautious while adopting fiscal measures to consolidate the general 
government budget, because the result of adjustment will not necessarily be non-Keynesian 
even if the three criteria or some of those mentioned above are presented. The expansionary 
effects of any fiscal consolidation are indeed conditioned on some crucial institutional factors. 
In the presence of liquidity constraints or inflexible labour markets, the ultimate 
macroeconomic results of an adjustment in the short term can prove to be doubtful. 
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